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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,

I

Case

vs.
INTRUSION-PREPAKT, INC.,
a corporation,

No. 9292

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in appellant's brief is substantially
correct; the discrepancies will be pointed out hereinafter.
In this action the plaintiff sought to recover from the
defendant the sum of $3,580.52, interest and costs, for repairing
a Chicago Pneumatic rotary compressor (Model 600) leased
by plaintiff to defendant in July, 1958. The lease was a standard
form prepared and used by plaintiff, the company's name being
imprinted at the top.
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It is undisputed that a compressor was delivered to
defendant, that defendant used it for about two weeks, that
on or about July 24 the compressor either quit running or one
of the defendant's employees stopped it, and that thereafter
the compressor was· repaired by plaintiff. Issue was joined on
whether and to what extent the repairs were chargeable to
defendant.
At the trial plaintiff produced the lease and a parade of
workmen, executives and bookkeepers-all employed by plaintiff-who told how they kept or didn't keep records and what
they did or didn't do to the compressor, the proof at the trial
and plaintiff's contention on this appeal apparently being based
upon the theory that quantity of witnesses is somehow equivalent
to quality of proof.
A reading of the lease (Exhibit 1) makes it clear that there
are some situations contemplated in which the cost of repairs
will be borne by the lessor, nor the lessee, and that the amount
to which the lessor is entitled for making repairs are its ((regular
charges" in some cases but its ((damages" in others. The following excerpts from the lease bear upon its construction and
upon the consequent liability of the lessee to the lessor for
repatrs.
((4. The lessor shall use reasonable care to see that
the equipment is in proper working condition before
shipment to lessee."
(( 5. On non-tractor equipment the lessee agrees to
maintain said n1achinery and equipment in the same
condition as when delivered to it by the lessor, usual
wear and tear excepted, * * * and to pay for all damages
to the equipment, except the usual and ordinary wear
.4
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and tear * * * and to return said property in as good
condition as when received * * * usual and ordinary
'vear and tear excepted * * * . On all tractor equipmeJ?t, the conditions in Paragraph 5 apply except that
the lessee agrees to fully 1naintain the machinery
covered in this contract while in his possession and
return it in the same condition as received from the
lessor or with no exception made for wear and tear."
(Emphasis added.)
0

8. In the event of notice to the lessor by the lessee

that the equipment is not in good, safe and serviceable
condition and fit for use upon its arrival, lessor shall
have the right to put said equipment in good, safe and
serviceable condition and fit for use, within a reasonable
time, or to cancel this lease."
(( 10. In the event of accident to, or breakage of, any

part of the equiptnent * * * the lessor may repair said
machinery for the lessee, using reasonable diligence to
make said repairs or replacements in the shortest possible time, and the lessee agrees to pay the lessor its
regular charges for any material or labor furnished in
making said repairs upon demand; in the event any
work is done outside of lessor's regular hours, including
work necessary by wear and tear, by reason of which
lessor shall be required to pay double time or other
overtime charges to its employees, or to anyone doing
the work for lessee, all of such charges will be paid
by the lessee to the lessor.''
'' 11. In the event the lessee accepts the machinery

and equi pn1ent, as herein provided, and thereafter the
said machinery proves defective or unfit for use, because
of accident or otherwise or, if for any other reason
lessee desires to discontinue the use of said machinery
or equipment, the only remedy of lessee shall be to
return the machinery to lessor and terminate this contract as herein elsewhere provided for * * * "
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(( 14. The lessee agrees to pay the lessor for all loss
and damage as occasioned by fire, theft, flood, accident,
explosion, wreck, an act of God or any other cause that
may occur during the life of this lease * * * . For the
purpose of :finding the valuation of said property in
order to detennine the loss, damage or injury thereto,
it is agreed by the parties hereto that the value as
hereinbefore stated shall be a true and just value forming a basis for such adjustment * * * ."
No one knew whether the compressor was inspected or
tested prior to the time of its delivery to defendant. Eugene
Sandell, No. 1 in the parade, thought that it would have been
done by Merle Kirkham (R. 96), but Mr. Kirkham, No. 2,
didn't see the machine prior to the time it was delivered to
the defendant (R. 122). There were no records available in
Salt Lake City, apparently, which would indicate what was done
to the machine there (R. 168).
After plaintiff was notified that the compressor was not
operating, it was picked up for repair. But plaintiff did some
things that seem unrelated to the repair of the compressor.
For example, there was a charge for engine oil filters, engine
oil, fuel filters (Exhibit 3, R. 113), {(making out expenses and
travel" (R. 126), and (for plaintiff's convenience), installing
a new pilot bearing (Exhibit 3, R. 106).
Mr. Sandell brought out also that the compressor was not
flushed out at Idaho Falls, even though the oil was noted to
be black and the rotor blades deteriorated (R. 101). A telephone call from Salt Lake City to Idaho Falls (it is not clear
whether this was charged to the defendant or not) suggested
that the machine, having been completely repaired, should be
flushed out (R. 102). Defendant was required to pay for 37
6
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gallons of compressor oil to replace 32 gallons already charged
to it (Exhibit 3, R. 111).
Mr. Sandell testified that the parts listed on the invoices,
and upon which the charges of Arnold Machinery Company
against the plaintiff were based, were ((list prices" and that
the list price did not represent plaintiff's cost (R. 107). He
testified that the mark-up varies, item by item, but the witness
agreed with his employer's counsel that the mark-up or any
particular item was ((irrelevant," because it varies all the way
down (R. 107).
Merle G. Kirkham testified that the first time the machine
was taken into Idaho Falls the oil was drained out of the supply
reservoir but he didn't look at it (R. 119), that he vol11;ntarily
changed the engine oil (R. 116), and that he didn't check
the meter at the time of delivery to tell how many hours the
machine had been operated.
Jack W. Gunn couldn't remember the time he worked on
the machine but assumed that the time slips shown him were
correct (R. 123).
Mike Uzelac, another of plaintiff's workmen, testified that
part of the work he did on the compressor after its redelivery
to Salt Lake City was ((preventive maintenance" and that part
of the time he had spent was to ((make out expense and travel''
(R. 126). He was not sure (R. 126) whether part of his time
was on another job. He didn't classify the damage to the
compressor as being ((usual wear and tear" but he expressed
no opinion as to what it would be classified in the trade, or
what the phrase meant as between the plaintiff and the
defendant (R. 128). Mr. Uzelac also testified that he didn't
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

know where a piece of metal (that he regarded as being responsible for the oil failure and damage to the machine) came
from nor how it could be put into the machine (R. 128). He
didn't know hoV\.r long filters last (R. 129) ; he wasn't familiar
with the machine of this particular type (R. 129) ; at the time
he did some work at Idaho Falls he didn't have a strainer
to check the oil ( R. 131 [which must have been true, since
there was no charge for a strainer on any Arnold invoice).
Mr. Uzelac didn't remember whether any pieces were missing
from the bearings in the machine (R. 133).
Mr. Allen J. Walker, fifth man in plaintiff's parade,
testified that he repaired part of the machine, that there was
a thermostat to protect the machine from overheating (R. 136).
David Liese, the only one of plaintiff's witnesses who
seemed to understand the workings of a Chicago Pneumatic
rotary compressor, stated that there was a spiral of brass metal
lodged bet"\\reen the high and low pressure cases which caused
oil starvation and resultant damage to the machine (R. 139).
He wouldn't describe the damage as ttusual and ordinary wear
and tear," but neither did he state anything about what the
custom in the trade was or what usual and ordinary wear and
tear meant to the plaintiff and defendant at the time they
entered into the contract. He testified further that used parts
were not put into the machine because he couldn't guaranty
that they would work properly (R. 142). He didn't know where
the metal came from (R. 142); it could have bypassed the
oil filter if the filter was dirty (R. 143). Filters can be used
for as n1uch as 500 hours and would not ordinarily be changed
or cleaned in less than 100 hours; if a piece of metal bypassed
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the filter he would assume that the filter was dirty (R. 145).
The Chicago Pneumatic rotary compressor has very small
tolerances and the manufacturer recommends checking the
blades every 1,000 hours (R. 147). The metal particle in
question was drawn in with a flow of oil (R. 150); he wouldn't
expect the particle to bypass a clean filter (R. 151). Mr. Liese
failed to answer responsively a question as to the number of
hours of operation which the machine would ordinarily be
expected to have prior to a complete overhaul (R. 151) . He
testified that if the air in the machine gets too hot the machine
should shut itself off (R. 15 2) ; and that the air would have
to be much hotter than the shut-off point to cause the discoloration noted in the metal in the machine (R. 15 3) .
William D. Hoffman took the stand to testify as to the
time necessary to ((repair the unit" (R. 156), Alma D. Jackson
did about the same (R. 158), and Alfred Glende testified, in
substance, that he was plaintiff's invoice clerk.
Robert D. Arnold, plaintiff's sales manager and treasurer,
testified that the check ordinarily made of equipment prior
to being shipped to a lessee did not include looking at the oil
filters or checking the safety features (R. 164) ; that the value
of the machine was $13,000.00 at the time of the contract
and after the repairs were made. He didn't testify as to the
value of the machine immediate! y before the damage but
presumably the $13,000.00 figure would have seemed right to

him.
Mr. Arnold also testified that the machine cost Arnold
Machinery Company $12,491.00 when it was purchased in
February, 1956 (R. 165). Since that time it has been used in
9
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Arnold Machinery Company's rental fleet, but Mr. Arnold
didn't know how many hours the machine had been operated
(R. 165-166). He would assume that the machine would be
operated no more than 175 hours per month (R. 167), though,
as rnay be noted from the lease, lessees are permitted to operate
the machine for 240 hours each month without extra charge.
The company does not maintain any records of the excess use
to which the machine may have been put by its lessees (R. 167).
The machine has never been overhauled (R. 167). At the
time a machine is leased, it is ordinariiy checked to see if it
is ((producing air" (R. 168). But in this particular instance
there was no record of what service was performed or what
checks made on the machine (R. 168). The ((list price" of the
machine at the time it was purchased for $12,491.00 was
$18,500.00 and the value of the time of rental (based on cclist
price") was $13,000.00 (R. 169). The time at which the
machine was overhauled, he said, would depend upon the kind
of use to which the machine had been put. He didn,t know
what kind of use the machine had had (R. 167-170). He didn't
know how long the unit had been run (R. 171). It is the
standard practice of Arnold Machinery Company to overhaul
machines when an overhaul is needed (R. 171).
The defendant called only one witness. Clifford Kullberg,
who was the plaintiff's job superintendent, testified that it was
his practice on the job to use an operating engineer to keep
track of the machinery (R. 172). Yet some of the air machinery
being operated off the compressor operated poorly from the
time the con1pressor was received, the equipment not ((hitting
hard enough" and the air volume appeared to be low (R. 174).
He attempted to rectify the trouble by repairing some of the
10
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other equipment, but after the compressor was repaired by
Arnold, the other equipment began to ·"vork all right. The
compressor was used for only 77 hours by the defendant before
it broke down (R. 175).
With reference to the statement of facts contained in
the appellant's brief: on page 2 the appellant states that the
compressor worked ((perfectly'' from the time of its delivery
on July 10 until July 24, confusing evidence with fact. The
evidence was in a double hearsay statement contained in a
letter introduced in evidence over the objection of the defendant
(Exhibit 9) ; but the jury was justified in believing from Mr.
Kullberg's testimony that something was the matter with the
machine when it was received at the dam site-though the
\vorkmen did not know it. The court's statement to the jury
was not to the effect that the jury could do whatever it wanted
to do with damages neven though there was no evidence on
the point," as stated by appellant. According to the record
(R. 188-189) :

ttl informed the jury that under my instructions they
were at liberty to return such amount as they, in their
judgment, deemed proper * * * . I also informed them
that an objection had been sustained to the question
relative to Arnold Machinery Company's cost and that
after consultation with counsel that the objection would
still be sustained and they would have to return such
a verdict from the evidence that they notv have as they
deemed proper." (Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court correctly refused plaintiff's motion for a

directed verdict.
11
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2. The plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof on

the issue of liability, and the verdict is contrary to the evidence
and against law.
3. The court erred in instructing the jury on the measure
of damages.

ARGUMENT

I
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
The appellant's characterization of the terms of the lease
shows that it has been led astray by its own circumlocution
in the three-page document. The construction asked for by
appellant is to the effect that in event repairs to the compressor
are necessary while it is being used by the lessee, the lessee
will pay the amount asked for by the lessor. Actually, there
were two material provisions of the lease; and, assuming a
right to recover, the amount of recoverable damages depends
upon the paragraph of the lease under which the repair charges
are claimed.
First, there is a promise to pay the plaintiff's regular
charges for Hlabor and materials" in event of Haccident or
breakage'' to the machine. This promise appears in Paragraph
14. Also, defendant promised to maintain the machine ttin as
good a condition as when delivered, ordinary wear and tear
excepted," and for failure to do this, the defendant promised
to pay plaintiff's ndamages." What the plaintiff has insisted
on doing throughout the trial and in its brief to this court, is
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calculating its ndamages" on the basis of its ((regular charges,"
whether for "labor and materials," or for something else.
The lease doesn't contemplate any such thing. And if the jury
was confused in its deliberation, the confusion resulted from
the failure of the plaintiff to take a stand on the kind of
claim it had. Plaintiff wanted to be able to recover under either
theory since it wasn't sure (and apparently still isn't) which
one may be supported by the evidence.
The statements of law quoted in plaintiff's brief are
interesting and represent the point of view with which defendant agrees, i.e., that if there is undisputed evidence on a point
it does not need to go to the jury, provided it is from a proper
source, is not weakened by cross-examination and there is
no reason for not believing it. Plaintiff's law is better than its
proof. Even the legal encyclopedia cited by the plaintiff
adopted the view that the testimony of a witness need not
be believed if it is conflicting and contradictory or susceptible
of inherent weaknesses or improbabilities or incongruities which
"in and of themselves naturally arise to contradict or impeach
the weight and credibility of the utterances of the witnesses.''
This view is supported by decided cases.
All of plaintiff's witnesses were interested in the outcome
of the suit, and there is good authority for the proposition that
this alone entitles defendant to a jury determination-whether
the testimony is inherently weak or not.
As stated in Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing
Company, 172 U.S. 401,43 L. Ed. 492, 19 Sup. Ct. 233 (1899):

(( * * * While

the jury has no right to arbitrarily
disregard the positive testimony of unimpeached and

13
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uncontradicted witnesses * * * , the very courts that
lay down this rule qualify it by saying the mere fact
that the witness is interested in the result of the suit
is deemed sufficient to require the credibility of his
testimony to be submitted to the jury as a question of
fact. "
A like view was taken by the Supreme Court of California
in Langley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 41 Cal. 2d 655,
262 P.2d 846 ( 1953), in which the only evidence relating to
damages was that of the plaintiff. The court said that ((although
plaintiff's testimony was the only evidence concerning the value
of the fish, the jury was the sole judge of his credibility and
should have been left free to disbelieve him."
Admitted! y, there are some courts that hold that a verdict
may be directed despite the fact that witnesses are interested
in the outcome of the trial; admittedly, too, the interest of the
employees of the plaintiff is not as great as that of the plaintiff
itself. However, the rule adopted by most of the courts is that
where a party is interested in the outcome of the trial his
credibility must always be regarded as involving an issue of
fact which must go to the jury.
Whether or not the interest of the plaintiff's witnesses was
such that their credibility should be passed upon by the jury
regardless of the positive character of the testimony, the
testimony itself was not positive and necessarily worthy of
belief. Many of the witnesses were unsure of themselves; there
were contradictions on the basis of charges and as to the cause
of the damage to the machine; and it was clear that the charges
made by the plaintiff did not represent the cost of repairing
the machine. In addition, the jury could believe from the
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testimony of the workmen and Mr. Arnold, that the machine
was due for an overhaul at the time it was leased to the
defendant, and that a substantial share of the charges should
be borne by the plainiff because of enhancement of the value
of the machine-in other words, that the charges were not
to "repair the damage" but to {(repair the damage and overhaul
the compressor.''
It is not incumbent upon a party to introduce witnesses
of his own to testify to certain facts if the testimony on the
other side doesn't necessarily support the facts. In the instant
case much of the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses was
improbable or contradictory, or tended to show that recovery
should not be allowed in the amount claimed. As said by the
the Supreme Court of Florida in Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla.
498, 146 So. 241 ( 1933):
ttMuch of the evidence offered in plaintiffs in error's
behalf, while uncontroverted, appears to be discredited
in many particulars. Such evidence is not necessarily
binding upon the court in the consideration of a motion
for a directed verdict. Testimony may be unimpeached
by any direct evidence to the contrary, and yet be so
contrary to natural laws, inherently improbable or
unreasonable, opposed to common knowledge, inconsistent with other circumstances established in evidence,
or so contradictory within itself, as to be subject to
rejection by the court or jury as; a trier of the facts. * * *
While the testimony of an unimpeached witness is
not to be arbitrarily disregarded, and must be measured
by the standard of common experience in human conduct or business usage, there may be such an inherent
improbability in the statements of a witness as to
induce the court or jury to disregard his evidence, even
in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony. A
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witness may be contradicted by the facts he states as
completely as by direct adverse testimony. There may
be likewise so many omissions in this account of particular transactions, or his own conduct, as to discredit
his whole story."
To like effect is Horicon v. Langlois's Estate, 115 Vt. 470,
66 A.2d 16, 9 A.L.R. 2d 195 ( 1949), in which the court stated
that ((even though the evidence is undisputed, it may be of
such a character as to afford ground for opposing inferences
of fact and, if so, there is a jury question." See also Jordon v.
O;Connor, 99 Cal. App. 2d 632, 222 P.2d 322 (1950) and
Anderson v. Liljengren, 50 Minn. 3, 52 N.W. 219 (1892);
and generally, 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Section 366.
Under Paragraph 5 of the lease, the measure of recovery
is ((all damages to the equipment, except the usual and ordinary
wear and tear." The cases hold that damages for injuries to
personal property are arrived at by subtracting the value
immediately after the injury from the value immediately before
the injury; that in the absence of direct evidence of value,
the cost of repairs may be taken into account; and that enhancement in value because of the repairs must be taken into
consideration. Angerman Co., Inc., v. Edgemon et ux., 76
Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169 ( 1930) ; Gen. Exchange Ins. Corp.
v. Young, 206 S.W. 2d 683 ( 1947), affirmed, 212 S.W. 2d
396, 357 Mo. 1099. [Loss of use may be an element of
damages; but in the instant case it was neither pleaded nor
a basis for it proved]. Plaintiffs own evidence was that the
charges did not represent its cost of repair.

If

{i~t':/a''

seeks to base its right to recover on the
provisions of Paragraph 10 of the lease, that is, for ~~accident
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to or breakage of" any part of the equipment, the proof still
does not justify the amount sought. Under Paragraph 10 the
n1easure of recovery is plaintiff's regular charges for any
"material or labor" to repair the damage. Plaintiff's invoices
include teregular charges" for a number of things besides
"material or labor": overhead costs, expenses, mileage, telephone calls, among others; and some charges for . things
unrelated to repair, e.g., engine oil, oil filters and fuel filters.
Moreover, the jury could believe the charges went beyond
those necessary for terepair," and that some of the charges
were made for an overhaul that was due in any event.
Under either theory of plaintiff, the jury was entitled to take
into consideration the various charges made by the plaintiff
for things other than materials and labor; the ((mark-up,"
and the fact that it varied '"rith the items; the amount of markup on the compressor itself, from approximately $12,500.00
(plaintiff's costs) to $18,000.00 (the ((list price"); the fact
that some charges represented work plaintiff did in its own
behalf and some represented charges for bookkeeping and ~or
correcting a job it failed to do right in the first instance.

II

;'

~

THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY, AND THE
VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND
AGAINST LAW.

;.-

It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the damages it seeks to
recover resulted either from tcaccident or breakage" to the

~

~
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machine within the terms of the lease, or from failure of the
defendant to maintain the machine in the same condition as
received, ((usual and ordinary wear and tear excepted."
Plaintiff's witness parade, including the qualified mechanic,
Mr. Liese, testified that they did not know how a metal particle
found its way into the compressor and became so lodged as to
block the flow of oil. Some speculated as to what might have
happened, but there was no clear evidence as to what did
happen.
The other evidence in the case points out conclusively
that the damage to the machine resulted not from anything
the defendant did, and not from any failure to maintain the
machinery, but from the failure of the plaintiff to use reasonable
care to see that the equipment was in proper condition before
shipment to the lessee, as required by Paragraph 4 of the
lease. It is apparent that the oil filter must have been dirty
when shipped to the defendant, since it is uncontradicted that
the defendant used the machine only 77 hours prior to the
breakdown, and that it is not necessary, under standards set
by the manufacturer, to clean the oil filter in less than 100
hours (R. 144; Exhibit 7, p. 11). It is also clear that had
the machine been proper!y maintained, a metal particle would
have been stopped by the filter. Moreover, even if, for some
strange reason, the oil filter did not pick up the particle, still
the oil starvaction would not do such damage to a machine
properly maintained and cared for prior to shipment. There
are safety features built into the machine to shut it off in event
air, water or oil become too hot (R. 136, 152-153; Exhibit 7,
pp. 13-14).
18
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It i~ , ~~~~t that the machine had not been cared for
by the
t and that the damage resulted directly from
that lack of care. Since the damage to the machine was to be
naturally expected, considering the condition of the machine,
and would have resulted merely frotn operation of the machine,
the damage was "usual and ordinary wear and tear" within
the meaning of the lease. Cf. Drouin v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 335,
67 Atl. 825, 827 ( 1907); Taylor v. Campbell, 123 App .Div.
698, 108 N.Y.S. 399, 400 (1908).
In addition, the plaintiff, in its proof, lumped together
both recoverable and non-recoverable damages and thus failed
to meet the burden of proof as to damages. Johnson v. Hughes,
120 Utah 50, 232 P.2d 362 (1951).

III
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
Plaintiff, during the trial and in its request for instructions,
tended to fuse and confuse the two paragraphs of the lease
under which recovery had to be based. As pointed out above,
the measure of recovery was dependent upon whether there
was ccaccident or breakage" to the machine, or a failure of
the defendant to return the compressor in the condition it
was at the time delivered to the defendant, except for usual
and ordinary wear and tear. Plaintiff would be entitled to its
regular charges for cclabor and materials,n or its legal damages.
Instruction No. 7, to which defendant objected, tends to confuse
the two sections of the lease, and permits plaintiff to recover
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not only regular charges for nmaterial or labor," but also to
recover ((reasonable" charges and expenses incurred for travel,
telephone, towing and meals incurred in connection with the
repairs. Such reasonable charges and expenses might be properly
considered in determining the amount of the ((damages" to
the plaintiff. But the plaintiff can't have it both ways. Either
it is entitled to its regular charges for ((material or labor" as
agreed to in the lease, or it is entitled to its ((damages."
By Instruction No.8 the court told the jury that the amount
of plaintiffs recovery should not be diminished by reason of
the fact that new parts used in repairing the machine were in
better condition than the replaced parts were at the time the
lease was entered into, since ((the evidence is uncontradicted
that used parts were unavailable."
The evidence was not uncontradicted that used parts were
not ((available." Mr. Liese testified that he would not use such
parts in the compressor.
Moreover, the obligation of the defendant was to make
the plaintiff whole, not to pay for the overhaul and betterment
of its machine. The cases that have considered the problem
are in harmony in saying that the enhancement in value of the
machine resulting from the repairs must be taken into consideration in determining the measure of damages. Gen. Exch.
Ins. Co. v. Young, 206 S.W. 2d 683,aff'd, 212 S.W. 2d 396,
357 Mo. 1099 (1947) supra; Restatement of Torts, § 928.
This would be true regardless of which paragraph of the
lease recovery is based upon, for what the defendant promised
to do was to repair the damages to or breakage of the machine,
not build a new machine or replace the old machine with a
new one.
20
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that if a business organization engaged in
the leasing of machines for a price wants to have the machine
maintained, repaired, and overhauled by the lessees throughout
the life of the machine and longer, the desire should be spelled
out with greater candor in the lease. The plaintiff in this case
has ignored the rule of contra proferentem and argued for a
new rule, pro proferentem, in substance rejected by this court in
Close v. Blumenthal, (No. 9196), not yet reported. Admittedly,
it would be possible to draw a lease stating that the lessee
shall pay for any repairs that become necessary during the
period in which the machine is in the lessee's possession. Such
a provision in a lease would be easy to understand, and the
lessee, knowing its terms, might exercise some judgment as
to whether it desired to enter into such a risky arrangement.
It is apparent that the draftsman of the Arnold Machinery
Company lease wanted the lessee to assume all the risks-but
without being aware of it. The trouble is that a hole was left
in it, and the lease failed to provide for the ((absolute liability"
now contended for by Arnold Machinery Company. The
lessee's promise was to ((maintain" and to pay agreed charges
for c caccident or breakage.''
Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving that the
defendant had anything to do with the damage to the machine.
Plaintiff failed to prove that it took steps to maintain the
machine or to inspect it or check it out prior to delivery to
the defendant. It failed to prove the cause of the damage.
And plaintiff's own evidence and the manufacturer's
manuals prove that the damage could not have occurred to
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the machine if it had been maintained properly prior to the
time of its delivery to the defendant, since there were safety
devices to turn the compressor off. Plaintiff failed to sustain
its burden of proof and defendant was entitled to a judgment,
no cause of action.
Moreover, even if the court could conclude that the
plaintiff had introduced enough evidence that the jury might
find some failure on the part of the defendant, still the plaintii1
did not differentiate its damages and did not satisfactorily
prove what damages resulted from the conduct of the defendant
and what costs were incurred because of the inherent character
of the machine prior to the time of its delivery to defendant.
This being true, plaintiff has failed to prove its damages and
defendant was entitled to judgment.
Finally, the court misdirected the jury on the question of
damages, and left it open for the jury to award certain damages
to the plaintiff to which it was not entitled under any theory.
By its Instruction No. 7 the court gave the jury the impression
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover both its regular charges
for {(material and labor," and reasonable charges for all other
kinds of damages resulting from the breakdown of the compressor. It is true, of course, that other instructions tended
to give the defendant the benefit of enhancement and to spell
out the theories of the two clauses of the lease; but this very
fact would tend to confuse the jury and lead it to arrive at
conclusions with respect to damages that were not warranted
on the evidence.
Plaintiff's appeal is not well taken, and the case should
be reversed and sent back to the lower court with instructions
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to enter judgment in favor of the defendant and against th(
plaintiff, no cause of action. And if a new trial is ordered, it
should be on the whole case, since misdirection on the issue
of damages must have affected the verdict as to liability.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Respondent
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